Local Politics and Development in Brazil 

October 2, 2019 12:00PM E53-482

How do citizens influence the distribution of public services? In a theory of “trading favors,” I argue that communities can coordinate through neighborhood associations and trade their collective votes for preferential access to public services. Communities with high community activity and strong leadership can coordinate their votes before an election and get the attention of politicians after the election to improve their access to public services. I focus on access to water, which is an essential and often scarce resource that is prone to political manipulation. Drawing on 18 months of fieldwork, I analyze an original household survey with respondents from 120 rural communities merged with precinct-level electoral data from the state of Ceará in Northeast Brazil. I use 104 qualitative interviews with rural residents, local leaders, state bureaucrats to develop and illustrate theoretical mechanisms. I find that water access is most reliable and secure in communities with high community activity, strong social ties, and constant leadership. I find evidence for my main mechanism: organized communities are more likely to concentrate their votes, and bloc voting improves water access. My findings shed light on the influence of collective action on local politics and development.

Latin American Working Group